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ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION AND COMPETITION - 
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES 
Glauco Avelino Sampaio Oliveira 
 
Abstract: Global firms’ strategies affect domestic and international 
competition; conversely, countries abide rules from transnational institutions to 
tackle externalities derived from globalization transactions. This essay debates 
the global governance of antitrust, the rise of competition aspects in the global 
economy and the institutional response. First, it discusses stylized facts 
regarding economic globalization and competition. Second, it investigates on 
the conceptual foundations of trade and competition policies. Finally, it 
suggests that, despite the lack of formal regimes, there is a global institutional 
convergence in competition practices, based on “order without formal law” and 
“competition advocacy”.  
Keywords: Globalization, competition, governance, institutions  
Resumo: A estratégia global das firmas afeta a concorrência doméstica e 
internacional, similarmente, os países obedecem a regras de instituições 
internacionais a fim de lidar com as externalidades derivadas da globalização. 
Esse ensaio debate a governança global do antitruste: o surgimento de aspectos 
concorrenciais na economia global e a resposta institucional. Primeiro, 
discutem-se fatos estilizados relacionados à globalização e à concorrência. Em 
seguida, investiga-se os fundamentos institucionais das políticas de comércio e 
de concorrência. Finalmente, sugere-se que, apesar da ausência de regimes 
formais, há uma convergência institucional global em práticas de concorrência, 
baseada, em “ordem sem lei formal” e “advocacia da concorrência”.  
Palavras Chave: Globalização, concorrência, governança, instituições.  
 
1. Introduction 
Competition is instrumental to a more efficient and innovative 
economy, it enhances economic welfare and encourage a fairer income 
distribution. In an economy with sound competition, consumers have a variety 
of products at lower prices, higher production and employment levels, while 
productivity and innovation thrives. Competition policies aims at increasing the 
overall competition environment in a domestic economy. Antitrust policy, by 
its turn, relates to specific policies and legislations to curb "market power" of 
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monopolies and oligopolies.  
Trade policy is a set of measures and actions that determine the degree 
of economic integration of a country with foreign markets, the depth of 
negotiated trade agreements, as well as the main instruments applied to trading 
partners. Trade policy increases the level of exposure of national firms and 
economic sectors to imports and it may spur investment and firm entry, thus, it 
has an impact on the domestic competition.  
The capture of public policy by private interests is a phenomenon 
typical of representative political systems. In this sense, trade policy is subject 
to the action of interest groups pushing to increase exports and to reduce 
imports. Although beneficial for domestic firms, by enhancing the market 
power of domestic monopoles and oligopolies, these actions may reduce 
domestic economic efficiency and consumer welfare. Besides, policies 
increasing the market power of exporting firms in international markets may be 
detrimental to the trade partners´ domestic economy. International cooperation 
emerged after the Second World War to create multilateral institutions in order 
to curb the protectionist pressures of domestic groups in trade relations, under 
the negotiating rounds of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 
later the World Trade Organization (WTO). Competition issues, meanwhile, 
have not followed the same track: an agenda dealing with “beyond the border” 
measures is stalled at the WTO. This essay aims to debate the international 
political economy aspects of trade and antitrust policies in order to analyze the 
transnational institutional convergence in global competition. It seeks to 
explain the global governance that emerged in international competition issues.  
After this introduction, section 02 debates economic globalization 
and competition, it discusses the lack of progress in negotiations about 
competition in the multilateral trade agenda, vis-à-vis changes in the productive 
processes of transnational corporations. Section 03 examines theories of trade 
and competition. It argues that comparative advantage theory has an 
international character, whereas the concepts of economic efficiency and 
welfare – common in antitrust practice – fit more properly to a domestic 
context. Globalization and dynamic aspects of trade policies add further 
complexity to these theoretical traditions. Section 04, remarks that, despite the 
absence of a formal multilateral regulatory framework, there is a trend toward 
informal convergence in the governance of competition, based on “soft law” 
and “order without law”, culminating with the concept of “competition 
advocacy”. Following from the discussions, the essay acknowledges that 
institutional and political approaches should be part of the analytic tools of 
antitrust specialists.  
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2. Economic Globalization and Competition 
2.1. Globalization and governance  
Globalization led to deeper economic interdependence among 
countries. National economies became so closely intertwined that the 
traditional dichotomy between domestic and foreign economic policies became 
less significant. Globalization is multi-dimensional phenomenon, involving the 
impact of financial globalization on domestic policymaking, including welfare 
policies (Bardhan, 2006), domestic and international collective action (Cerny, 
1995) and the differences in returns from factors of production (Rodrik, 1997). 
The liberalization of trade and investment, the financial regulatory reforms and 
the rapid technological developments have changed fundamentally the 
conditions of competition. Markets have become more open and 
interconnected, transcending national borders. These trends also changed the 
characteristics of trade restrictions: previously levied by national governments, 
now firms impose and suffer them, as their role in global markets increased 
(Büthe, 2014; Pérez Motta, 2016).  
Economic globalization intensified the interdependence between 
national economies and international markets; hence, it reinforced the tension 
between rules addressed at multilateral trade agreements and domestic policies. 
The weakening of national governments capacity to carry on autonomous 
policies lead to a natural shift toward transnational forms of governance. 
However, contrary to what happened in trade and finance, transnational forms 
of governance in competition issues did not developed. A possible conflict 
between building up of transnational institutions and the loss of national 
political power prevailed in antitrust issues culminating in a different 
institutional trajectory and a distinctive global governance structure (Djelic, 
2005).  
Some methodological issues are necessary at this point. First, it is 
important to conceptualize "governance” as the manner in which power is 
exercised in the management of economic and social resources and qualifies 
the use of political authority (Drezner, 2007). The Bretton Woods institutions 
form the governance structure of the international economic order in the second 
half of the 20th century. These institutions are, among others, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the World 
Bank, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), later turned into 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
In this context, multilateral economic institutions, such as the ones 
quoted above, emerged and consolidated as mechanisms of regulation of 
international markets and created minimum rules of coexistence between 
countries. The literature of international political economy (IPE), also known 
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as “open economy politics”, discusses the rationale behind the upsurge of these 
forms of global governance and the expansion of “international regimes” - a set 
of rules aimed at improving forms of international governance in several issues 
areas, and not only on economic relations (Kahler and Lake 2003, Lake 2009). 
Broadly speaking, these institutions and regimes were designed to tackle 
negative externalities derived from unregulated international economic 
relations, such as financial flows, or domestic (protectionist) trade policies, that 
could weaken the international order itself. In international finance, for 
example, it is necessary to address short run international financial flows, which 
can undermine domestic monetary and fiscal stabilization policies. In 
competition policy, though, there is a void. The lack of headway regarding 
competition regimes is puzzling when one considers that the doomed 1947/49 
Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO), which created 
the GATT, included rules concerning anticompetitive business practices, more 
than 50 years ago.  
International trade has experienced the establishment of multilateral 
rules since the 1950s, leading to a piecemeal but significant reduction in import 
tariffs and other trade related agreements, such as on services (General 
Agreement on Services – GATS) and on intellectual property (Trade Related 
Intellectual Protection –TRIPS), up to the creation of the WTO. In global 
competition, however, despite attempts, there was virtually no advance. A more 
structured and formal effort within the multilateral framework happened when 
countries launched a working group on trade and competition policy (WGTCP) 
at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996. This project failed, 
however, amid the difficulty to advance the Doha round itself (Hufbauer and 
Kim, 2008; Evenett and Jara, 2013; Büthe, 2014).  
Parallel to the multilateral trade agreements, regional forms of 
economic integration also liberalized trade flows among country members. 
Several regional integration experiences since the 1950s, created preferential 
trade agreements, free trade areas, customs unions and common markets. The 
European experience evolved to an economic integration mechanism that 
embarked several disciplines, culminating into full monetary and economic 
union that erected institutions aimed at regulating markets. European Union 
member countries seek to adopt a common regulatory framework in order to 
expedite economic convergence and to tackle negative externalities associated 
with different levels of development and domestic governance among member 
countries. Therefore, a common competition policy regime, complementary to 
the national systems, not only curbed market power of firms, but it was 
instrumental to the advancement of European values in the regulation of 
markets and towards a single market. (Manganelli et al., 2010; Warlouzet, 
2010).  
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2.2. Globalization, value chains and competition  
Contemporary productive dynamics of firms have importance for 
competition issues, for instance, the trend towards vertical productive 
integration through global value chains, which, among other characteristics, 
splits the assembling line of a single product among different countries. The 
overall reduction in tariffs for inputs and intermediaries enabled firms to 
fragment their production lines in various locations in order to explore the 
comparative advantages of different countries and to add value in each 
production stage (Aldonas 2013). Besides, regional integration processes allow 
countries to take the lead in terms of supplying factors of production such as 
“capital”, high skilled labor and/or high-end technologies, whereas other 
countries provide basic inputs or low skilled labor.  
More open foreign direct investments regimes (FDI) enhances the 
global strategies of transnational firms, which, by establishing subsidiaries, 
pursue national comparative advantages and seeking new markets. With the 
reduction of tariffs on inputs, there is an incentive to allocate productive plants 
in different countries. In this process, they acquire assets and, consequently, 
there was an increase in the number of international mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A). These processes also follow business cycles of international markets 
and may ensue higher mark ups, abuse of dominant position and 
monopolization in the national markets (Ghosal, 2000). Additionally, the 
greater control over productive inputs due to vertical integration in the value 
chains, for instance, can foreclose markets to competitors (Sekkat, 2006). 
Therefore, the opening to foreign investment, one of the premises of 
globalization, does not exclude anti-competitive practices of private companies.  
According to Wooton and François (2010), the liberalization of world 
tariffs in the tradable sector may not improve world welfare in the presence of 
imperfect competition market structures in the distribution channels of 
domestic markets. They sustain that the degree of market power exercised by 
distribution sectors can serve as an effective import barrier. In an empirical 
exercise, they perceived that large retail chains partially captured the rents 
created by the trade in textiles and apparel– under the Multi Fiber Agreement 
(MFA). Hence, a GATS based agreements may boost trade only if it addresses 
the issue of domestic competition. The lack of multilateral institutional antitrust 
framework is a setback to world trade liberalization (François and Horn, 2007).  
Briefly, companies are promoting global strategies in production and 
services, seeking comparative advantages of different countries, setting up 
production standards, relocating productive factors and entering new markets 
through increased direct investments and subsidiaries. These international 
movements can have effects on competition, for example: cartels beyond 
national borders, agreements to exclude foreign competitors, abuse of dominant 
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position, mergers between companies in different countries, vertical markets 
foreclosure in regional trade blocks, among others. Contrary to what occurred 
in international trade, there was little advance of a legal framework for 
international competition in multilateral and regional agreements, with the 
exception of the European Union. Therefore, it is worth stressing the expansion 
of trade and foreign direct investment did not prevent the surge in 
anticompetitive practices.  
2.3. Incentives and political economy in competition policy  
Trade policy is international in nature and deals with the incentives 
and barriers imposed by national governments to foreign trade and investment. 
Diplomatic /trade, negotiations among nations evolve on "mercantilist" 
interests, that is, trade surpluses and the accumulation of foreign exchange is 
positive, while trade deficits are bad. To offset this mercantilist bias, the various 
GATT negotiating rounds ensured mutual “markets access" among trading 
partners. Therefore, the principle of "reciprocity" is a cornerstone in the 
GATT/WTO system, creating domestic incentives: in a practical sense, 
exporting groups supplying to world markets would benefit from “market 
access” and “reciprocity”, compensating for the possible losses from groups 
competing with imports. Thus, trade liberalization created important political 
economy incentives, toward integration with the international economy. Free 
trade is beneficial to sectors with relative comparative advantage; as it improves 
national income and welfare, thus, offsetting for the domestic losers. In short, 
domestic exporting interests were instrumental to advance international trade 
agreements.  
Competition policy, in contrast, deals with measures to curb domestic 
market power, due to the action of private firms in monopolistic or oligopolistic 
industrial structures, which may or may not have international causes and 
consequences. Despite the existence of private anti-competitive practices 
perpetrated by firms on an international scale, the degree of convergence 
regarding this discipline among countries was much weaker than the traditional 
trade issues. In the recent round of WTO negotiations (Doha Round), this 
degree was inexistent, culminating with the leaving behind of the multilateral 
discussions about competition rules.  
Competition policy originally is "domestic" in nature, referring 
mainly to the national economic (consumer) welfare, within the jurisdiction of 
a country. This type of regulation, ultimately, includes foreign firms and, in 
fact, economic globalization increased the cases of anti-competitive behavior 
with international effects. Domestic antitrust authorities have faced cases that 
go beyond their domestic borders. Both the U.S. and the E.U. competition 
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authorities have already condemned anticompetitive practices with effect in its 
territory, regardless where the restrictive conduct happened. 
“Extraterritoriality” refers to the argument made by some countries 
(particularly the United States) so that their antitrust laws apply in their 
jurisdiction, even if the alleged misbehavior occurred in another jurisdiction 
(Utton, 2006; Sokol, 2011).  
Competition policy relates to national legislations and to the 
enforcement ability and incentive of each country, without any adjustment 
and/or effective international control, on foreign firms. This may cause 
conflicts regarding the sovereignty over the extraterritorial application of 
national legislation, but there is a trend toward institutional convergence 
(Sokol, 2011).  
Due to political economy interests, the maintenance of a good 
competitive environment tends to be diffuse, in comparison to trade policy, 
which addresses localized interest groups. Although competition can be 
considered a "public good", as it generates non-rival and non-exclusive benefits 
to all participants in a market, there is no well-defined group willing to do push 
(lobby) for antitrust policy whereas there is in trade policy – where exporting 
and/or import-competition groups stand out. Collective action behind interest 
groups influences domestic trade policy agendas, when there are well-defined 
winners and losers in terms of policy outcomes. (Olson, 1969; Magee et. all, 
1982).  
The incentives to set up a competition institutional framework are 
peculiar to each country. The perception about the need for a good competitive 
environment – as well as the importance given to the antitrust law vis-à-vis 
other public policies tends to vary. Even assuming that countries value 
competition, in general, there are choices in economic policies, depending on 
the stage of economic development and maturity of the economy, as well as of 
political and institutional domestic factors (Weymouth 2015). Additionally, the 
adoption of competition rules involves other policy spheres that add complexity 
to that balance. A common conflict regards industrial and investment policies 
– for example, credit incentive or preference margins – which can favor 
domestic oligopolistic groups’ vis-à-vis international competitors. Kowalski et 
al (2013) and Perez Motta (2016), for example, discuss the role of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) in trade policy and international economic relations, and the 
extent of their influence in domestic competition. It is worth stressing: besides 
exporting, many SOEs operate in imperfect competition structures.  
The effects of anti-competitive practices from global suppliers and 
international private companies on domestic markets harm economic 
development. Therefore, the lack of the appropriate means to combat such 
practices may impose significant costs to developing countries (Tojo, 2002). 
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Hence, not to equip the country with an effective competition policy in order to 
protect (exporting) domestic actors, and to promote selective investment and 
industrial policies, can turn out into a flawed strategy and undermine the 
domestic economy, as it may make it easier for monopolistic and oligopolistic 
companies operating in the country, including foreign ones. In short, each 
country and society has its political option to contemplate competition, but 
given a globalized economy, the lack of doing so may be harmful to less 
advanced countries.  
3. Political economy theories of trade and competition in global markets  
Neoclassical economic theory supports that free markets create 
optimal allocation of scarce resources (production factors), bringing greater 
economic efficiency and social welfare. Competition is instrumental to achieve 
those aims. However, antitrust policy relies on less secure and transparent 
economic foundations than the traditional international trade theory because the 
perfect competition model can hardly explain what is seem both at international 
and domestic markets nowadays. Imperfect competition – that is, oligopolistic, 
monopolistic and monopolistic competition market structures, characterizes the 
modern economic order. Market power is progressively part of the international 
economic arena not addressed either by domestic antitrust institutions or by 
current international trade treaties. This section revises economic theory behind 
trade and competition policies.  
3.1. Trade, comparative advantage and perfect competition  
International trade theory relies on the concept of comparative 
advantage: countries have mutual benefits to specialize in what they are more 
capable to produce, then, engage in exchanges. There is an efficient allocation 
of resources and maximization of the returns from the productive factors 
(capital and labor), not only at the domestic, but also at the international level. 
The comparative advantage model assumes perfect competition, that is, the free 
flow of goods and factors of production in international and domestic markets, 
prices will equal marginal cost, and supply and demand will meet at 
equilibrium. Additionally, the Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) model indicates that 
domestic sectors with comparative advantage - that use intensively the 
abundant production factor in the country - will benefit from free trade with 
world markets. Hence, such industries become competitive exporters, accruing 
more revenue and improving national income, thus, creating additional 
incentives to trade liberalization. Conversely, industries using intensively the 
scarce resource of the country compete with imported good, but since they are 
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less competitive relative to foreign rivals, even at the domestic market, these 
sectors will experience revenue loss and will oppose trade.  
Economic welfare decreases in the presence of domestic tariffs - or 
their equivalents - here understood as the difference between the domestic and 
the international price of a good. The classical analysis indicate that import 
tariffs benefit the domestic producers and the government to the detriment of 
consumer. A negative net welfare effect ensues with the loss of consumer 
surplus, not offset by the increase in producer surplus and government revenue 
after protection. Krugman (1989) and Sacher (2005) shows that there are 
differences when the protection is set up as a quota instead of a tariff; due to 
monopole power, the former has a more pronounced impact on welfare, while, 
as long as, there is free entry, the later may be less harmful. The analysis is 
more complex when, in addition to tariffs, domestic monopolists apply trade 
defense mechanisms, such as antidumping.  
This situation of welfare loss is detrimental when domestic producers 
have market power. Inefficiency will be greater, because the protected sector 
can exercise monopoly profits. All things equal, the profitability of domestic 
sellers correlates negatively with the ratio between imports and domestic 
consumption, especially if sector concentration is high (Schmalensee, 1989). 
Political economy logic shows that, despite the loss of domestic income, as long 
as import-competing sectors are able to organize and influence polices, they 
may be able to pass protectionist measures. Protectionist measures create 
negative externalities causing a decrease in global welfare.  
As simple as the perfect competition model might be, its conceptual 
clarity provided a powerful justification to world trade liberalization. 
Therefore, despite domestic protectionist pressures in the period of crises, there 
has been a strong headway in trade liberalization in the last decades of the past 
century relied. The tariff reduction movement was particularly strong in 
primary and agricultural products, in which international markets approach the 
perfect competition model. However, this process had setbacks: the global 
financial crisis of 2008 brought about severe slump and protectionist measures, 
but the drop in trade flows was smaller if compared with the financial crush of 
the 1930s due to the building up of international institutions that attempted to 
mitigate the effects international crises (Evenett, 2010). Domestic protectionist 
measures were constrained by formal institutions that provided an international 
governance in trade issues, thus avoiding “race to the bottom” policies. The 
liberal institutionalist IPE literature discusses the creation of such institutions 
since the end of World War II: from an institutional perspective, multilateral 
trade agreements attempted to curb domestic protectionist backlash in order to 
sustain global welfare. International agreements – by compromising domestic 
support toward trade liberalization – tie the hands of policymakers and avoid 
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the return of restrictive policies in hard times. In short, global governance 
institutions are instrumental not only to advance tariff cuts and to curb 
protectionist pressures, limiting domestic market power in the tradable sectors, 
but also to spread a liberal ideology that prevailed in the international economic 
order.  
3.2. Antitrust economics and imperfect competition 
Antitrust policy aims to protect a competitive economic environment, 
to avoid market power and inefficiency and to increase consumer and general 
welfare. Additionally, antitrust wishes to ensure “free entry” to curb market 
power of incumbent firms. On the domestic market, such assessment depends 
on the overall analysis of the domestic antitrust agency, which may adopt a 
stringent approach regarding concentration, may emphasize consumer´s vis-à-
vis producer´s interests and may use efficiency prerogatives. On the 
international market, these decisions, due to the lack of a multilateral consensus 
about global welfare and efficiency, are more difficult to reach.  
Three dimensions raise the concern of antitrust authorities and justify 
the intervention in economic structures in order to reduce the risk of market 
power: collusion, mergers and abuse of dominant position. All these aspects are 
capable of causing an inefficient static balance, in which any monopolist, or 
group of companies, in the case of collusion, offers fewer products at higher 
prices. In a globalized economy, the operations of foreign companies abroad 
are likely to affect competition in other country’s markets in all three mentioned 
aspects. Therefore, it is justified that national competition authorities worry 
about international aspects of antitrust.  
Additionally, competition policy evolves in the context of other 
economic policies, such as industrial, investment, privatization and trade. 
Authors recognize the complementarity of these various public policies (Fox, 
2011). There is a role for national governments in providing the correct 
incentives to facilitate adjustment to the process of economic globalization – 
which tends to increase competitive pressures - seeking synergies in these 
policies to promote economic growth. However, there are potential 
inconsistencies and tensions that emerged from recent developments in those 
policies. For example, a recent study from the OECD (2013) discusses the role 
of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in international trade: many are domestic 
monopoles, which expand their market power to foreign markets in (industrial) 
commodities – such as chemicals and minerals. Competition distortion may 
arise in international markets due to the role of these SOEs – even to the point 
of forming international cartels (Hoekman and Martin, 2012). The antitrust 
literature also expresses concern about how governmental interventions may 
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harm domestic competitive environment through regulations, granting of state 
and private monopolies, tariff and non-tariff measures (Abbott and Singham, 
2013), but also due to special benefits to domestic firms in public procurement 
(Anderson and Kovacic 2009).  
Economic models characterized by imperfect competition, with 
economies of scale, which require dynamic allocation of investments to provide 
economic returns are ubiquitous. "Strategic Trade Theory" adds elements of 
industrial organization to international trade theory in the direction that 
concentrated industries (oligopolies and monopolies) can promote economic 
efficiencies. Therefore, contemporary world trade may not easily fit traditional 
comparative advantage theory nor by traditional antitrust theory (Krugman, 
1989). This dynamic aspect of international trade has been present in cases of 
mergers involving companies with high economies of scale and with 
pronounced learning curves for the maturating of investments in research and 
technology (R&D). In industries with high learning curves, markets do not 
encompass many participants and only a minority of companies will thrive. 
Therefore, "first mover advantage" policies that increase market power 
domestically – will help such companies in international markets. This process 
may increase national welfare in the end, but it may hamper competition 
domestically and, principally, abroad. François and Horn (2007), for instance, 
model how “beggar-thy-neighbor” competition policy, that is, the lax 
application of antitrust, can benefit domestic exporting firms.  
Domestic government intervention can create "positive externalities" 
to other domestic sectors due to, for example, productive diversification. The 
potential benefits of economies of scale can be external or internal to firms. 
Internal economies of scale stem from high fixed costs of production. Whereas, 
external economies of scale exist when the best techniques of production of a 
firm can be quickly transmitted to another producer (learning-by-doing). Even 
when best techniques are protected by patents or by trade secrets, the competing 
firms generally benefit in some measure because the innovative companies 
cannot capture exclusively all the benefits of the technological breakthrough 
(positive externalities) (Bown and McCoullogh, 2013). Upon capturing foreign 
markets, this process leads to higher profits for the firms of the exporting 
country. A change in the domestic demand of the importing country toward the 
more competitive international supplier ensues, causing a loss of the domestic 
firm market share. a reduction in the scale of production and a fall of 
profitability.  
On the international market, this process of domestic support may 
harm competition and be considered anticompetitive by antitrust authorities of 
other countries. For instance, in the case of mergers between international firms 
that have received subsidies and domestic protection. These firms may capture 
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markets abroad and create conditions for abuse of dominant position. These 
policies may spur antidumping appeals by trade partners at the WTO. 
Meanwhile, due to the lack of a multilateral international antitrust framework, 
the competitive aspects of such policies relate only to a bilateral basis, or the 
domestic antitrust agencies will address such mergers/conducts according to 
their national rules (extraterritoriality)  
In short, despite the common conceptual background of international 
trade and antitrust policies (neoclassical economics), there is quite a difference 
in the application of theories to practical problems. The lack of institutional 
convergence toward transnational forms of regulation of anticompetitive 
practices amplify these divergences. The imperfect competition characteristics 
of international markets, in which governments act in favor of domestic 
companies, as well as the monopoly power of firms in foreign markets, 
highlights the conflict among these policies.  
The lack of transnational institutional responses for the globalization 
of anticompetitive practices is a puzzle, when compared to other areas of 
international economic relations, where there is a minimal convergence in 
transnational regulations. Next, I discuss some alternative institutional 
explanations for the lack of such convergence in global competition.  
4. Institutional responses to competition in international markets  
Institutions are set of socially imposed constraints on individuals, 
shaping habits, cognitive experiences and references Institutional analysis 
wishes to untangle the causal mechanisms of a given economic phenomena, 
emphasizing the micro-macro relations between individuals and the society. 
Great emphasis is given by the actions and reasoning of agents as unit of 
analysis, such as countries and firms - under this social constrained 
environment. Institutions of economic governance are mechanisms to govern 
common goods (Ostrom, 1990). An open and liberal international economic 
order is a common good because, in addition to be non-rival and non-exclusive, 
it maximizes global welfare. Protectionist policies may create negative 
externalities and undermine that order. Hence, institutions that regulate and 
limit those policies bring stability to the system and preserve the order. Pagano 
(2011) discusses the complexity of institutions and the difficulty of 
implementing institutional changes in a context of interlocking 
complementarities, that is, stable and resilient institutional formats. His analogy 
with biology shows that “protectionism” and “subsidies” are common in nature 
and in institutional settings. Historical specificity matters because ‘past 
institutional choices open up some paths and foreclose others for future 
institutional development’ (Ostrom, 1990: 202).  
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Competition relates to cultural and social specificities of market 
transactions, long ingrained in domestic institutional settings within countries. 
Therefore, interlocked domestic institutions that protect national firms are 
difficult to change, to the detriment of the domestic and foreign competition 
environment. Industrial policies that support “national champions” may reduce 
competition domestically and abroad, decreasing global welfare. As discussed, 
transnational firms may act unilaterally taking advantage of domestic restrictive 
competition environments.  
An alternative explanation for the lack of formal multilateral 
governance in competition regards the private provision of collective goods - 
the approach of rules versus laws (Ellickson, 1991). In that sense, national 
antitrust authorities and private parties might gather to decide on minimal rules 
without a formal biding legislation and an authority imposing them.  
Therefore, the lack of formal framework to tackle competition 
challenges in global markets has brought about forms of alternative 
governance. Instead of formal bidding rules of international organizations, 
which often involve sanctions against deviant members – in international 
agreement´s parlance, “teeth” -  soft law is an alternative to the hard law. This 
framework was possible due the emergence of an international competition 
community, which discusses antitrust issues and recommends policy directives 
on a non-binding basis, even though, according to some analysts, there is a 
process of homogenization of antitrust practices and rules under the influence 
of the U.S. antitrust. The International Competition Network (ICN) is an 
example of informal, non-bidding and networking organization (Djelic, 2010).  
Furthermore, a bilateral agenda in antitrust issues also provides a 
basic governance framework. For example, the U.S. (Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission) and European authorities (D.G. competition) 
established transatlantic ties in competition issues (Evenett et al, 2000). 
However, it is worth mentioning, mergers and anticompetitive conducts in 
knowledge intensive industries have often been causing divergence between 
authorities.  
Institutions such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the OECD, the World Bank, among others, 
developed directives in competition policy. Academics and epistemological 
communities proposed broad police guidelines to countries in order to provide 
them with minimum standards in several policy areas, including competition. 
Technical papers, studies, and policy recommendations on specific issue areas 
of competition enforcement help to spread such knowledge. (Sokol 2011; Fox, 
2011).  
The OECD, for example, lays down a series of guidelines in order to 
ensure competition concerns in the framework of broad public policies– the 
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Competition Assessment Toolkit (CAT) – suggesting their adoption by 
members and non-members countries (OECD, 2011). These guidelines relate 
to competition specific issues, such as public procurement and anti-cartel 
measures. That organization also attempts to gauge the overall effectiveness of 
the antitrust law, as well as the autonomy of the domestic antitrust authorities 
with a series of indicators (Alemani et al, 2013). Peer reviewed assessments of 
antitrust authorities and legislation circulate among member and non-member 
countries in order to evaluate the overall shape of competition institutions. In 
short, there has been an increase in the number of countries with competition 
legislations and authorities. Although there is no supranational body of antitrust 
practices, there is a process of institutional maturing of domestic competition 
authorities, which, due to the presence of a transnational networking is 
advancing a minimal set of rules.  
One of the ideas these informal groups are advancing is “competition 
advocacy” - it is a mission for the competition authorities to advise other 
governmental agencies on the benefits of competition and to caution about the 
negative impacts of its lack. Evenett (2006) discusses the importance of 
competition advocacy, based on the economic theory of regulation, despite his 
skepticism about the enforcement ability of antitrust authorities in this area. The 
author acknowledges the importance of competition advocacy, which should 
not be an exclusive function of the antitrust authority, but part of several 
governmental policies.  
In an international context in which countries refuse to create a formal 
competition regime in multilateral organizations and the international financial 
crises have increased governmental interventions, the approach of “competition 
advocacy” has gained popularity because its non-binding requirement and it 
had overall positive effects. The ICN defines competition advocacy as "actions 
taken by the competition authority related to the promotion of a competitive 
environment in the economic activities, through mechanisms unrelated to the 
legal mandate of competition law enforcement (non-enforcement), mainly 
through its relationship with other government entities in order to increase 
public awareness of the benefits of competition”.1 
Hence, competition advocacy is one of these issue specific areas of 
antitrust institutions that has reached a minimal consensus, due to the work of 
an international community. Cartel combat, in the intersection of trade and 
competition, is another example.  
Despite potential productive efficiency effects, globalization brought 
about anticompetitive and collusive behavior among firms. In the past 
                                                     
1 International Competition Network (ICN). 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/ (accessed 08/25/2017). 
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international cartels were ubiquitous up to the period between World Wars, 
when most national economies even supported them. In addition to acting in 
domestic markets, cartels channel their production to foreign markets. Export 
cartels motivated the adoption of anti-dumping legislation in many countries 
(Büthe, 2014). According to a "mercantilist" view of the economy, cartels with 
international operation may benefit a particular country to the extent that 
domestic cartelized producers extract economic rents from international 
consumers. Countries that are net exporters in cartelized sectors have incentives 
to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor competition policies - that is, a lax enforcement 
of domestic competition (François and Horn, 2007). International cartels in a 
given product amplify the problem, as there are (informal) agreements between 
firms from different countries, further decreasing world welfare. (Hoekman and 
Martin, 2012).  
Despite the absence of formal international agreements, domestic and 
international cartels have been addressed effectively on a networking and co-
operative basis, gathering domestic antitrust agencies and interested parts, 
under the auspices of ICN.2 Hence, informal rules based on “cooperation” 
enforce cartel combat in countries that do not have the legal meanings to combat 
them.  
Recent examples of cooperation among national authorities involve 
the alleged transnational cartel in the São Paulo´s metro system, which gathered 
several transport companies and multinational conglomerates from Spain, 
France, Germany, and Korea, among others. Brazilian – including the antitrust 
enforcement agency CADE – and foreign authorities joined forces to 
investigate and prosecute these companies. This cooperation advanced even 
considering that these firms operate in high-scale and high-end markets, 
characterized by imperfect competition. Many of them have thrived due to 
historical governmental support – in terms of subsidies, tax breaks and public 
procurement contracts- in their countries of origin.  
Hence, this is an example on how cooperation in antitrust issues may 
arise, even when there are no formal multilateral agreement and in an imperfect 
competition market structure where political economy pressures are ubiquitous.  
5. Conclusion 
This essay discussed the relationship between international trade and 
competition in global markets. Due to global strategy of transnational firms, 
globalization affects competition in international markets. From a theoretical 
                                                     
2 http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/cartel%20wg/icn_chapter 
_on_international_cooperation_and_information_sharing.pdf (accessed 09/01/2017). 
REVISTA DO IBRAC Volume 23 - Número 2 - 2017 
274 
perspective, neoclassical economics identifies competition as an element for 
maximizing welfare and efficiency in markets. Contemporary international 
economy developments, such as economic and productive globalization 
integrated national economies and firms worldwide and set the incentives for 
the creation of regulatory framework in international trade.  
Despite the expansion of formal international institutions and 
agreements aimed at regulating trade relations, no such arrangements happened 
in competition issues, which followed a distinctive institutional trajectory. The 
integration of productive chains and the internationalization of firms has 
impacts on domestic and international markets, so domestic antitrust agencies 
act to curb the domestic market power of firms that operate abroad. Besides, it 
is visible the relationship between market power and international trade with 
the preeminence of imperfect competition structures in global markets. 
Imperfect competition may create different equilibrium, characterized by 
economic concentration, and, due to dynamic effects, it may enhance domestic 
welfare, but not necessarily, it improves global gains. A political economy logic 
shows that national governments support domestic firms in global markets.  
Therefore, relying on a technical approach – be it legal or economic - 
in global antitrust governance should not exclude from the analysis the driving 
forces of anticompetitive behavior, that is, market power and political power. 
In fact, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, it should be obvious that 
political power, and not only market power, should be at the core of antitrust 
analysis (Ayal, 2013). Hence, the researchers dealing with competition policy, 
who have greatly benefited from the gathering of expertise due to networking 
and co-operation, would also benefit from an institutional and political 
economy methodology. These methods may be able to grasp the resilience of 
domestic interest groups affecting policies and the consequences on global 
antitrust.  
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